But an objection will undoubtedly be raised here: Is it possible to go beyond nature? We do not hesitate to answer plainly: Not only is it possible, but it is a fact. Again it might be said, is this not merely an assertion; what proofs thereof can be adduced? It is truly strange that proof is demanded concerning the possibility of a kind of knowledge instead of searching for it and verifying it for oneself by undertaking the work necessary for its acquisition. For those who possess this knowledge, what interest can there be in all this discussion? Substituting a “THEORY of knowledge” for knowledge itself is perhaps the greatest admission of impotence in modern philosophy. Essays: Oriental Metaphysics
I said “THEORY,” but here it is not a question of THEORY alone; this is a point that needs further explanation. Theoretical knowledge, which is only indirect and in some sense symbolic, is merely a preparation, though indispensable, for true knowledge. It is, moreover, the only knowledge that is communicable, even then only in a partial sense. That is why all statements are no more than a means of approaching knowledge, and this knowledge, which is in the first place only virtual, must later be effectively realized. Here we find another discrepancy in the more limited metaphysics to which we referred earlier, for example that of Aristotle. This remains theoretically inadequate in that it limits itself to being, and its THEORY seems to be presented as self-sufficient instead of being expressly bound up with a corresponding realization, as is the case in all Oriental doctrines. However, even in this imperfect metaphysics (we might be tempted to say this demi-metaphysics), sometimes statements are encountered that, if properly understood, would lead to totally different conclusions; thus, did not Aristotle specifically state that a being is all that it knows? This affirmation of identification through knowledge is the same in principle as metaphysical realization. But here the principle remains isolated; it has no value other than that of a merely theoretical statement, it carries no weight, and it seems that, having propounded it, one thinks no more about it. How was it that Aristotle himself and his followers failed to see all that here was implied? It is the same in many other cases, where apparently other equally essential things are forgotten, such as the distinction between pure intellect and reason, even after having defined them quite explicitly; these are strange omissions. Should one see in this the effect of certain limitations inherent in the Occidental mind, apart from some rare but always possible exceptions? This might be true in a certain measure; nevertheless, it is not necessary to believe that Western intellectuality has always been as narrowly limited as it is in the present age. But after all, we have been speaking only of outward doctrines, though these are certainly superior to many others since, in spite of all, they comprise a part of the true metaphysics. For our part we are certain that there has been something other than this in the West during the Middle Ages and in olden times; there certainly have existed among an elite purely metaphysical doctrines that could be called complete, including their realization, a thing that for most moderns is barely conceivable. If the West has lost the memory of this completely, it is because it has broken with its proper tradition, which explains why modern civilization is abnormal and deviationist. Essays: Oriental Metaphysics
If the fundamental identity of rites and symbols is more closely examined, it may be noted in the first place that a symbol, understood as a graphic figuration, as it is most commonly, is only as it were the fixation of a ritual gesture. (NA: These considerations relate directly to what we have called the “THEORY of gestures” which we have several times had occasion to allude to, but without its having been possible to treat of it up to the present.) In fact it often happens that the actual tracing of a symbol to be regular must be made under conditions that give it all the characteristics of a true rite; a very clear example of this in a low domain, that of magic (which is nonetheless a traditional science), is provided in the preparation of talismanic figures; and on the plane that more immediately concerns us the tracing of yantras in the Hindu tradition is no less striking an example. (NA: The “tracing board” of the lodge in ancient Masonry, which indeed formed a true yantra, may be likened to it. The rites concerned with the construction of monuments for traditional ends might also be cited as examples here, for monuments of this sort in themselves have necessarily a symbolical character.) Essays: Rites and Symbols